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Introduction
xtem al sector proble m s have continued to pose serious
cha lle n ges to econo m ic
m anagement in Nigeria .
There is the challenge of
condu cting trade p olicy
w ithin the framework of the
World Trade Organisation's
[WTO] rules and regulati o n s witho ut co m p r omising the country's short
and long-term inter ests.
Even with the re-introduction of the Dutch Auction
system of exchange rate
m an agement, it appear s
that a generally satisfactory
approach ha s not been
fo und to exchange r ate
man agement, as the foreign
exch ange m arke t is still
characterized by exch ange
rate instability, significant
parallel market premium
and decl in in g for e i g n
exchange reserves.
External debt servicing has

E

continued to p ose a serious
burden on the country . As
the country is no t able to
service the debts fully as
and when due, the debt
stock continues to rise even
w hen no new borrowing
takes place.
Accordingly, this p ap e r
discusses the policy thrusts
w ith respect to three issues
in 2004, viz:
• Trade policy;
• Exchange rate policy;
and
• External debt management.
The bu dget statement do~s
n ot contain much inform ation on the issues. The
information u sed in the
discussion was obtained
from complementary circulars and inputs into the
budget.

2. TRADE POLICY
Trade policy in 2004 is to be
conducte d w ithin t h e
fram ework of the Trade
Liberalization Schem e of
the ECOWAS, and pro-

tection in the context of the
remedies allowed by the
World Trade Organisation
[WT O].
Accordin g to
President Obasanjo, in his
budget speech :
"On the issue of tariffs,
w aivers, duties and concessions, we intend to bring
coherence and structure to
our policy. As you are
aw are, Nigeria is committed
to common external tariff
re g ime w ith o th e r
ECOWAS countries.
Accordingly, govern men t is
w or king to w ar d s t a riff
harmoni zation in ECOWAS
in the n ear es t possible
future. H owever, we are
mindful of the n eed to
p rotect som e of our local
industries from d umping
and unfair competition and
w e propose to do this w ithin
the rem edies allowed u s in
the context of the WTO and
regional frameworks."
2.1 Tariff Policy and Import
Prohibition
It appears that no tariff
changes have been effected
or proposed in 2004, per-

•Prof. Mike I. Obodon is the Director-Genero/, Nigerion Centre for Economic Monoge ment and Administration (NCEMA),
Ibadan.

---------------~1,---------------

Volume 28 No. 2

April/June 2 004

haps in view of the significant tariff changes in
2003. Those amendments
have probably been retained in 2004. The customs
tariff changes in 2003
largely addressed the
concerns of manufacturers
through tariff reductions on
major manufacturin g
inputs and tariff increases
on mainly finished products or inputs which can be
sourced locally. Custom
d uty rates on m ajor raw
materials/ inputs for the
manufacturing of various
products were reduced in
order to revitalize ailing

industries, increase sectoral
capacity utilization and
enhance their co mpe titiveness as well as increase
employment generation.
Table 1 shows that the
number of tariff reductions
in all the sectors/ products
ranged from 4 for Articles of
Stones, Plaster, Cement,
Asbestos, Mica or similar
materials, Ceramic Products and Glass wares to the
high est of 143 in the
Products of Chemical and
Allied Industries. Tariffs
were increased in five of the
eight sectors/ products
ranging from 2 for the

Machinery and Mechanical
Appliances, et al, products
to 10 in the Products of
Chemical and Allied Industries. The latter included
items such as dinonyl [10 to
25 %] and candles/tapers
and the like [20 to 45 %] .
Annnex 1 shows examples
of products whose tariffs
were reduced, increased or
retained .
The major trade policy
pronouncement in 2004
relates to the ban placed on
the importation of a number
of items. In a circular dated
Febru ary 25, 2004, and titled
"Import Prohibition Order",

Tabl e 1: Year 2003 Tariff Amendments
Tariff Reductio n
[No. of Items]

Tariff Increase
[No. of Items]

Tariff Unchanged
[No. of Items]

A.Agricultural Sector

18

-

-

B.Mineral Products

13

-

3

C.Products of Chemical
& Allied Industries

143

10

3

D.Pl astiq'Rubber and
Articles Thereof

20

9

-

£.Textiles and Textile
Articles

6

-

-

F.Articles of Sto nes,
Plaster, Cement, Asbestos,
Mica or Similar Material s,
Ceramic Products and
G lass Ware

4

2

-

G.Base Meta ls and
Articles of Base Metals

25

8

-

Machinery and Mechanical
Appliances: Electrical
Equipment, Parts Thereof,
Sound Recorder, Reproducers,
Television Image and Sound
Recorder and Reproducers, Parts
and Accessories of such Articles

14

2

1

Sector/Product

'

Source:Federal Ministry of Finance [Budget Office) Circu lar on " Implementation
of the Year 2003 Budget Fiscal Policy Measures and Tariff Amendments".
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the Honourable Minister of
State for Finance announced the prohibition of
importation of many items
including textile fabrics of
all types and articles
thereof, excepting those
listed for exclusion; men's
footwear and bags of
leather and plastic (excepting ladies ']; soap and
detergents; furniture;
assembled bicycles; flowers
(plastics and fresh]; fresh
fruits; cutlasses, pick axes,
spades, shovels, wheel barrows, pork and pork products, beef and beef products, mutton, lamb and goat
meat; tooth pastes; pencils;
ball point pens; plas tic
plates, knives, spoons,
forks, cups, buckets, bowls,
bins containers and
hangers; barytes an d
bentonites; vegetable oils;
corrugated boards and
cartons; and live or dead
birds. A grace period of 90
days, effective from 7th
January, 2004, was allowed
to enable importers who
must have entered into
irrevocable trade agreement before the release of
the ban order to allow them
to process and clear the
goods at the prevailing duty
rates.
Thus, in the last few years,
there has been a consistent
effort by government to
increase effective protection
for local industries and also
conserve foreign exchange.

Also, the ban on certain
imports is an avenue for
operationalizing the objective of self-reliance and
reduced economic dependence as well as serve a
m edium for promoting
discipline in our consumption habits (Obadan, 1980:
53], with the increased
protection, government
appears to have recognized
the fact that some developing countries, Nigeria
included, are not well
equipped at the present
time to participate profitably in the international
competition in the global
economy. The high level of
international competitiveness demanded is hampered by numerous capacity
constraints at the policy,
institutional and enterprise
levels. In Nigeria's case, a
conducive and enabling
environment is lacking and
the infrastructural support
constraint is very strong. In
many cases, enterprises
have had to provide their
own electricity and telecommunications facilities, sink
their boreholes, and even
construct/ maintain their
roads all at prohibitive costs
and all these have adverse
implications for competitiveness (Obadan, 2000:
71].
A very significant aspect of
the import ban i s the
expected encouragement of
investment in local prod-

uctio n of manufactured
goods through import
s ubstitution and the offering of protection to existing
infant industries against
well established foreign
competitors.
Like other
developing countries Nige ria re gard s indus trialisation as the key to her
economic d evelopment.
Protective policies are
therefore inevitable to support industrialization programmes. While free trade
is perhaps a better policy for
highly industrialised countries, the infant industry
argument is of particular
appeal to developing countries .
This argument
recognizes the fact that in
developing countries there
are certain industries w ith
potentials for expansion
and for such industries to
survive they need to be
protected against foreign
competition. Besides generating external econ omies
these industries are likely to
benefit from internal
economies of scale. Protection will thus enable
them to expand, reduce
costs and be in a position to
face foreign competition.
This is the argument of the
protectionist.
Free traders, on the other
hand, argue that experiences in developing countries show that such industries never admit of their
maturity. Consequently they

-------------~--- ------------=-
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continue to agitate for a
continuation of protective
policies. It has further been
argued that apart from the
difficulty of identifying and
meas uring internal and
external economies for the
purpose of determining
which industries to protect,
protection breeds an atmosphere where inefficiency,
lethargy and lack of innovation thrive.
Notwithstanding, the real
basis for protecting infant
industries remains valid.
This is that if as a result of an
infant industry growing the
society gains it is not
umeasonable for the society
to pay a price in terms of
protection " in order to see
the infant to maturity"
[Wells, 1973].
Thus measures aimed at
achieving the country's
industrialization goal
through increased investment in manufacturing will
not only increase income
and enhance backward and
forward linkages in the
development and utilization of the nation's resources but will also create
employment opportunities.
Indeed, the medium and
long-term multiple employment effects of the ban are
very likely to be quite
substantial especially when
investors would have fully
taken advantages of the
manufacturing opportunities thus thrown open to

them. However, in order to
minimize abuses of the
privilege of protection it is
n ecessary for the country to
monitor constantly the
performance of the infant
industries. This can further
assist in the determination
of the duration of protection. Besides, government may have to map out
strategies to deal with some
negative effects of the ban
on the economy, especially
in the short-term. These
include the following:
• apart from the
immediate effect of the
possible retrenchment
of some workers in the
affected import areas,
there is the issue of
reduced government
revenue in the form of
loss of import duties on
previous! y tariffed
goods that are now
banned;
• the possible intensification of smuggling.
This inevitably flourishes only when control
in one form or the other
is introduced on the free
flow of goods between
national borders. It is,
perhaps in the light of
the above two effects
that it has been argued
that import prohibitions
tend to be ineffective
and encourage smuggling as well as deny
government of import
duty revenue. On the

other hand, tariffs are
generally more efficient
and can be relied upon to
achieve the objectives of
protecting local industry, reducing consumption and boosting government revenue; and
• as a result of lags
created in the shortterm the ban is likely to
attract scarcity values to
some commodities that
may at present not be
produced in sufficient
quantities, thus
resulting in rather
exploitative prices.
Indeed, it is not unlikely
that some business
en t erp ri ses would
capitalize on the short
period scarcity to earn
economic rent.
This
ac tuall y leads to
repercussions on the
market s tr u cture in
terms of development
of monopolistic
tendencies and practices
among local manufacturers.
A major observation with
respect to the growing
protection of domestic
industry is that the tariff
concessions, import bans
and protection appear to
derive from individual or
group pressures on the
government with respect to
the protection of individual
commodities rather than
from an agreed strategy on
the development of priority
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sectors. The implica tions of
this are many, one of w hich
is that tariff concessions and
protective m easures are not
borne ou t of negotiations
w hich commit the benefiting sectors/ industries to
d eliver som e tar gets on
outpu t, income, prices, and
employm ent as well as competitiveness to reciprocate
the concession s .
Very
importantl y, prot ec ti ve
measures m ay m ake little or
no impact on com pe titiveness, outp ut and p rices as
long as the environmental
constraints poor electricity
and water supply and other
infr a s tru ctur e
r e m a in
bi ndi n g .
U nd er th e
circumstan ces, ind u s tries
remain infant and unable to
outgrow concessions. And
tariff concessions may turn
out to be less important in
competitiveness compared
to adequate provision of the
n ecessar y infrastruc ture
w hich would ena ble the
industries to prod u ce a t
lower costs, and enhance
the competitiveness of their
products a t home and in the
global marke t.
Th e r efore, besides t h e
above, it is important to
have a clear vision of the
industrial sectors of priority
to prom ote in p hases and in
a h o lis tic way -n o t jus t
foc using on protective m easures-su ch tha t w ha tever
concessions that are given
w ill m ake an impact. More-

over, it is necessary to have
protective measures to be
the outcom e of a process of
negotia tion between the
gove rnm e n t an d th e
manufacturers.
Through
this process, concessions
given would have to be
m a tched by agreed targets
in outp ut, in co m e and
e m p l oy m en t , a nd
red uctions in prices, w hich
enhan ce competitiveness.
and finally, as I had pointed
in 2001 [Obadan, 2001: 4],
for maximum effectiveness
of the p olicies, it is im portant for governmen t to
continue to intensify efforts
on :
• a d e qu at e s u pply of
infr astru ct ure.
The
absence of good infrastructure - electri city,
fuel, telecommunications,
water supply results in
produ cer s I additional
investment in alternative sources of su pply,
all of w hich increase
costs of produc ti on
u n n ecessaril y and,
hence, neutralize the effects of tariff protection.
The econom y cannot be
transformed indu strially
n or can it be com petitive
if the infrast r u ctural
base cont inu es to be
weak;
• complementing the tariff
incentives to agriculture
w ith adequate provision
of rural feeder roads,
electricity, pipe-borne

water , a m ong o ther
things;
• strengthening the naira
in the foreign exchange
market. Con tinuo u s
depreciation of the naira
neutralizes the desired
effects of tariff reductions;
• tackling the menace of
dwnping and smuggling
in the economy. Manufactu rers have no t relented at poin ting o u t
th at these two men aces
have v irtu ally killed
many domes ti c
ind us t ries, especially
those in tobacco, text iles, p h armaceutical
and tyres; and
• im provement of th e
m acro -policy regime,
especially the dismantling of m ultiple tax reg i mes. There h ave
been reports that the
Lagos State Governmen t has introduced a
sales tax tha t is d ifferen t
from the existing value
added tax. This appears
to be" one tax too m any".
2.2 Pre-Shipment Inspection Versus Destination
Inspection

According to the budget
statement, th e government
proposes to move ahead
with destination inspection
in 2004. To this end, a
cabin e t level implem enta tion committee, under the .
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Chairmanship of the
Ministry of Transport, had
been set up to help work out
th e technology, risk
management issues and all
other issues connected with
destination inspection. The
government further pointed
out that since January 1,
2004 is no longer realistic, a
new start date would be
announced later.
But
meanwhile, according to the
CBN's Monetary, Credit,
Foreign Trade and
Exchange Policy Guidelines
for Fiscal 2004/2005, all
goods, except personal
effects, used motor vehicles
and perishables, i.e. day-old
chicks, human eyes, human
remains, vaccines, yeast,
periodicals/ magazines,
imported into the country
sh all be subjec t to preshipment inspection in the
country of supply and
issuance of an appropriate
Clean Report of Inspection
[CRI].
The destination inspection
of imports is to replace the
pre-shipment inspection
schemes for imports and
exports. This policy had
been approved for implementation for a long time
now, indeed, since the late
1990s. Government had
acknowledged that, over
the years, both the import
and export inspection
schemes have not achieved
their objectives, i.e. to
enhance the grow th of imp-

April/June 2004

ort and export trade, stop
the drain on foreign
exchange reserves, and
ensure that goods imported
are government approved,
meet quality and quantity
standards and are well
priced. While the preshipment of imports has
caused delays in the importation process, the export
inspection scheme added to
costs of exports and made
them less competitive in the
international market.
As I had observed in 1999
[Obadan, 1999: 1140],
"While the destination
inspection policy is a desirable and laudable one, as it
replaces the rather anachronistic pre-shipment inspection in an era of dereg ulation, its successful
implementation is doubtful,
especially in the short to
medium term when vital
equipment and facilities are
absent. Experts have
pointed out the need for
prerequisite facilities such
as sophisticated X-ray
equipment, a well equipped
clinical/ forensic laboratory,
as well as "research" or
"study" centres belonging
to the state, but operating
c omm ercia ll y. These
facilities will speed up the
assessment of all goods
arriving the ports. The only
snag for now is that the
facilities and equipment are
non-existent.

Therefore, in light of the
likely implementation problems, the destination inspection policy may have to be
reviewed for im plementation in phases".
This advice has obviously
not been heeded and so
many years after, the
destination inspection scheme has not been able to
take off.
3. EXCHANGE RATE
POLICY AND MANAGEMENT
Two notable new foreign
exchange market policy
measures for 2004/ 2005
relate to the following:
• freedom given to
a uthorized dealers to
deal m a ut onomous
funds in their own right,
subject to complian ce
with advised Open
Position Limits. However, no bank would be
a llo wed to purchase
au t onomous funds ,
including inter-bank
funds, in the market on
behalf of a custom er
without a valid, duly
documented underlying
transaction from the
customer; and
• the pegging of the amount which bureaux de
change can sell at a maximum of US$2,500.00.
However, according to the
Central Bank's "Monetary,
Credit, Foreign Trade and
Exchange Policy Guidelines
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for fiscal 2004/ 2005" in a

Table 2: Naira Exchange Rate Movements January, 2002-December, 2003

1

continued effort to stabilize
the exchange rate for the
naira, as well as enhance the
efficiency of the foreign exchange allocation through a
market-based exchange rate
determination, the Dutch
Auction System [DAS],
reintroduced in July, 2002
has been retained in
2004/2005.
The DAS
replaced IFEM which was
designed a s a two-way
quote system, and intended
to diversify the supply of
foreign exchange in the
econom y by encouraging
the funding of the interbank
operations from privatelyearned foreign exchange.
The achievement of a
realistic exchange was an
additional objective of IFEM.
But problems relating to
supply rigidities, and the
persistent fiscal excesses of
the government and the
associated excess liquidity in
the system adversely affected
the operations of IFEM.

Period

Exchange Rate
[N/USS)

Rate of Depreciation
/ Appreci.1tion (o/o]

Cu mularive
Depreciation l¾I

113.96
114.75
116.04
116.10
116.54
118.49
121.24
125.65
126.46
126.48
126.82
126.88

0.45
0.69
1.12
0.05
0.38
1.67
2.32
3.64
0.64
0.02
0.27
0.05

0
1.14
2.27
2.32
2.70
4.37
6.69
10.38
10.97
10.99
11.26
11.31

127.11
127.32
127.16
127.37
127.67
127.83
127.77
127.90
128.58
129.76
136.61
137.21

0.18
0.17
-0.13
0.17
0.24
0.13
-0.05
0.10
0.53
0.92
5.28
0.43

11.49
11.66
11.53
11.70
11.94
12.07
12.02
12.12
12.65
13.57
18.85
19.29

2002
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

2003
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Sourcc:Ccntu!BankofNigcria

above objectives have
hardly been achieved. The
parallel market premium is
still significant while
foreign exchange reserves
have tended to decline
rapidly. Furthermore, the
goal of having a stable and
realistic exch ange rate has
The DAS was expected to yet to be achieved. Most of
serve three purposes, viz:
the time, the naira exchange
• reduction of the parallel rate has exhibited the
market premium;
features of uni-directional
• conservation of the depreciation and instability.
dwindling foreign Table 2 shows exchange rate
exchange reserves; and
movement over the two• achievement of a real- year period, 2002-2003. Out
istic naira exchange of the 24 months, the exchan co-e rate appreciated
margrate.
.
.
ina\\y only two tunes m
However, the operation ot March and July, 2003. The
the DAS for close to twho cumulative depreciation of
years has shown that t e

the exchange rate was 19.3
per cent, 11.3 and 7.96 per
cent in 2002 and 2003,
r espectively. Thus, the
operation of the DAS h as
been less than satisfactory.
The professional discipline
expected to be instilled in
the participants by the
n ature of the market has not
materialized as rent-seeking
behaviour and multiple
bids by banks have continued to manifest. Also,
speculative d e m and/ capital flights, round
tripping and expansionary
fiscal operations of govern-

ment have not h elpe d the
performance o f the market.
. g sugaoWhat the foregom
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ests is that the search for a
satisfac tory framew ork/
approach for determining
and managing the exchange
rate is yet to be over. The
experimentation thus goes
on. One thing that is
noteworthy though is that a
reform of the fiscal operations of government along
the path of fiscal balance
will moderate the growth of
monetary aggregates and
lessen the demand pressure
in the foreign exchange
market. Furthermore, if the
limitations of the market are
appreciated, then appropriate interventions of the
Central Bank in the market
can be better appreciated.
4. EXTE RNAL D EBT
MANAGEMENT

Budget 2004 acknowledges
the external debt stock at
about US$31.0 billion as
serious and unsustainable.
It constitutes an overhang
and deterrent to private
investment and generally to
growth and development.

External debt management
will continue to pose a
daunting challenge in 2004.
This challenge relates to
how to service the debt in a
manner that is satisfactory
to creditors without compromising the requirements
for domestic growth and
development. The budget
rightly acknow ledges that
the payment of huge debt
service would jeopardize
growth as little resources
would be ava il a ble t o
finance capital expenditures
for health, education and
infrastructure.
Yet, there are a group of
creditors [the must-pay
group of creditors] whose
debt must be serviced as
and when due, otherwise
serious consequences may
result to the country. For
example, multilateral loans
[e.gWorld Bank loans] must
be serviced as and when due
to avoid s uspen sion of
disbursements as well as the
granting of new loans.
Also, default on the Par

Bonds and Promissor y
No te s ca rr y ser i o u s
penalties including the
seizure of the assets of the
Central Bank of Nigeria and
the Nigerian
a ti onal
P etroleum Corporation
abroad. In the case of NonParis Club bilateral debts,
default results in penalty
charges of between one and
three p er cent per annum
above the normal rate
charged.
Such d efaults
would also affect the credit
r a t in g of the country.
According to the Debt
Management Office [2003],
fail u re to honour the
country's debt obligations
will undermine Nigeria's
efforts to secure:
• substantial debt relief in
the medium-term;
• secure restoration of the
much-needed Western
countries' export credit
guarantee covers for
imports of goods and
direct investment into
Nigeria; and
• the restoration of debt
conversion for eligible

Table 3: External D ebt Service Requirements and Provisions in 2004 [US$ MiJiion]
Debt Service Due in 2004

Type of Debt

State Government Federal Government
2,394.9

Total
3,335.8

Provision in
2004 Budget

-

Proportion of
Provision in Debt
Service Due (%1

0

Arrears as at 31/2/03

940.9

Mul tilateral

182.0

260.1

442.1

433.00

97.9

Paris Clu b

403.1

1,617.1

2,020.2

1,000.00

49.5

London Club (Par Bonds]

72.0

18.1

90.1

90.12

100.0

Promissory Notes

177.9

177.9

171.18

96.2

Non-Paris Cl ub

-

11.5

11.5

11.64

101.2

Total

1,597.9

4,479.5

6,077.5

1,706.00

28.1

Source: Debt Management Office, "Debt Service Requirements in Fiscal Year 2004" [December 18, 2003).

,~
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Paris Club debts, which
was suspended by the
Club in reaction to the
Federal Government's
suspension of the IMFs up ervis e d standb y
arrangement in April,
2002.
As Table 3 shows the total
external debt se r v i ce
obligation in 2004 of both
federal and state governments is US$6.104 billion
[taking into consideration
all outstanding arrears].
This total amount is made
up of the d ebt ser vice
payment due in 2004 amounting to US$2.768 billion
and the arrear s carried
forward from 2002 and 2003
to 2004, amount to US$3.336
billion. Of the total amount,
about US$1.597 billion or 26
per cent is due from the
various States of th e
Federation, while abo ut
US$4.506 billion or 74 per
cent is due from the Federal
Government.
Table 3 also shows the provisions for debt servicing in
2004 in relation to what is
required.
It shows that
taking cognizance of the
country's lean resources as
well as its short and long
term interest only 28.1 per
cent of debt service due or
US$1,706.0 million will be
paid in 2004. If this amount
is actually p aid then the
balanc e of US$4,371.5

April/June 2004

million will be carried over
as unpaid arrears in 2005.
And unpaid arrears have
the implication of increasing the debt stock even
w hen no new loans are
contracted [in this case by
about US$1,035.7 million or
US$4,371.5-3,335.8 million].
Th e imp licatio n of the
foregoing is the strong need
for Nigeria to continue to
seek substantial relief from
the heavy debt burden
throu g h initiatives tha t
ha ve fea tur es of debt
reduction [see Obadan,
2004].
The opportunity
provided by the current
economic reform agenda
NEEDS should be used to
canvass for reliefs provided
by d ebt buy -back, debt
conversion and outright
cancellation.
5. CONCLUSION

In the last few years, the
government a ppears t o
h ave recognized the need to
cond u c t trade po l icy,
specifically, trade liberalization in a sensible and
orderly manner. H ence, the
growing effective protection being accorded local
industries. However, in
order to minimize the
abuses of the privilege of
pro tec ti on, the country
must monitor constantly the
performance of the infant
indus tries. To ac tuali ze

this, government would
h ave n egotiated certain
performance targets with
the protected industries,
especially in r elation to
ou tput, income, employment and prices a nd
competitiveness. Besides, it
is desirable to map out
strategies to deal with some
negative effects of the recent
ban on imports on the
economy, especially in the
short term. Very importantly, protection alone may
not enh ance competitive n ess. A con du cive
environment for production
may be the critical factor.
Therefore, to prepare local
industries for effective and
profitable participation in
the globalization and liberalization process, government should provide the
necessary infrastructure to
enable industries produce
at lower costs and enhance
the competitiveness of their
products at hom e and in the
global market.
The operation of the DAS
shows that its objectives of
reducing the parallel market premium, conserving
for ei gn exchange, and
achieving a realistic naira
exchange rate have hardly
been achieved. The professional discipline expected to be instilled in the
market participants by the
DAS has not materialized as
rent-seeking behaviour and

"'-----------------• :•----------------"
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multiple bids by banks have
continue d to m a nifes t .
Also, sp eculative demand
/ capital fl ights, round
tripping an d exp ansionary
fi scal operations of the
gove rnm e nt h ave n o t
helped the performance of
the market. Thus, the search
for a satisfactory framework/ approach for determining the exchange rate
and managing foreign exchange is yet to be over .
Considering the limitations
of the m arket, appropriate
interventions by the CBN
are indispensable. Taking
cognizance of the country 's
budget con straints, only
28.1 per cent of debt service
due in 2004 w ill be p aid.
Unpaid arrears will continue to accumulate w hile the
debt stock grows. There is
the strong need for Nigeria
to seek substantial relief
from the heavy debt burden
thro ugh initiatives that
h ave fea t u r es o f d eb t
reduction . A seriou s implem entation of the N EEDs
reform programme m ay be
helpful in this regard .
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•

•

B. Mineral Products
• Tariffs redu ced for 13
ite ms r a nging from
sulphur of all kinds
other than su blime [15
to 5%] to Base Oil [10 to
5%]
• Existing tariff retained
for 3 item s.
C. Products of Chemical
and Allied Industries

•

•

•

A. Agricultural Sector

Tariffs reduced for 18
items ranging from fish

Tariffs reduced for 143
ite m s rangi ng fro m
Disodium Sulphates [15
to 5 %] to Pickling preparations f or met a 1
surface [10 to 5 %]
Tariffs increased for 10
items, e.g., Dinonyl [10
to5% ], candles/ ta pers
and the like [20 to 45 %] .
Existing tariffs retained
for3 items.

D.Plastic/Rubber and
Articles Thereof

•

Annexl
Highlight of Year 2003 Fiscal
Policy Measures and Tariff
Amendments Effective from
27th January, 2003

Tariffs reduced for 18
items ranging from fish
m eal [15 to 5 %] to Residues of starch [15 to 5 %]
Tariffs increased - nil

•

Tariffs reduced for 20
i te rns ranging fr om
New Pneumatic tyres,
"herring bone" [40 to
30%] to filter paper and
pa per board [20 to 5 %] .
Tariffs increased for 9
ite m s r angi n g fro m
Ethylene Vinyl Acetate
[5 to 25 %] P a rticl e
Board and Fibre Board
[30 to45%].

E. Textiles and Textile
Articles
• Tariffs reduced for 6
i t ems r a n ging from
high tenancity yarn of
Nylon[25 t o 5 %] t o
m osquito n et [75 to
40%].
• Tariffs increased for 0
item s.
F.Articles of Stones,
Plaster, Cement, Asbestos,
Mica or Similar Materials,
Ceramic Products and
Glass Wares
• Tariffs reduced for 4
ite ms ranging from
Millstone Ceramics [35
to 5 %] to ampoules [30 to
5%].
• Tariffs increased for 2
ite m s Cer a mic til es
glazed [40 to 50 %] and
ceramic tiles unglazed
[35 to 50%] [in other
words, duty harmonized for glazed and
unglazed ceramic tiles].
G.
Base Metals and
Articles of Base Metals

•

•

Tariffs reduced for 25
items r a n g in g from
silicon [10 to 5%] to LPG
appliances, for gas fuel
and others [30 to 5 %] .
Tariffs increased for 8
item s, e.g., stan dard
w ire, ropes and cables
[10 to 20%] and Crown
corks [30 to 40%].

H. Machinery and
Mechanical Appliances:

__________

-----------~,

__,,,
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Electrical Equipment, Parts
Thereof, Sound Recorder,
Reproducers, Television
Image and Sound Recorder
and Reproducers, Parts and
Accessories of such
Articles
• Tariffs reduced for 14
item s, e.g. parts for air
conditioner [15 to 5% ],
Fuses [25 to 5 %], parts
for Fridges/ freezers 25
to5%].
• Tariffs increased for 2
item s R20 batteries [40
to 45%], Finished tapes
[10 to30%].
• Existing tariffs to remain
1 item [Battery cages for
poultry industry [2.5%].
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